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Summary 
The private sector has become a dominant actor in agricultural research-particularly in 
the area of agricultural biotechnologybecause it is estimated that the market for genetically 
engineered crops will become a $20 billion per year business by the year 2010. In the United 
States alone, the private sector spends probably 20-30 times what is spent on agro-biotechnology 
research geared toward developing countries. 
Two issues are critical to discussion about public-private partnerships in biotechnology: (1) 
intellectual property protection of enabling technologies and (2) shifting boundaries between public 
and private sector research. Regarding the first, as research in agricultural biotechnology expands 
globally, so, too, will the number of new proprietary technologies, which will create further barriers 
to the smaller players’ freedom to operate. Unless special partnership arrangements with the 
private sector are established, the CGIAR and its partner public research institutions will not have 
access to the enabling technologies controlled by the private sector that are significant for 
addressing the problems of developing countries. Regarding the second, in developing countries, 
the market segments of greatest interest to the private sector are those where the private sector 
can capture value. Research on other market segments, such as subsistence farming in resource- 
poor areas, must be conducted by the CGIAR and other public research institutions. As the public- 
private sector boundaries in research change, public research institutions will need to realign their 
strategies. 
There is a compelling case for the CGIAR to strengthen its capacity in biotechnology. A 
CGIAR with a stronger biotechnology capacity would: (1) be better connected to the cutting edge 
research in biotechnology; (2) have easier access to and stronger absorptive capacity to use 
proprietary private sector technology; (3) build intellectual assets that could enable it to participate 
more effectively in the changing global biotechnology market; and (4) in general, help expand the 
developing world’s freedom to operate. An increased role in biotechnology, however, would 
compel the CGIAR to reconcile the public. good nature of its work with the norms prevailing in the 
biotechnology industry, such as patenting and licensing. 
While strengthening its biotechnolfogy capacity, the CGIAR should not weaken its existing 
strengths. Biotechnology should be treated as one of the tools Center researchers can use in 
conjunction with other powerful tools in developing agricultural technologies needed in poor 
countries. Also, in strengthening its biotechnology capacity the CGIAR should avoid “re-inventing 
the wheel” and aim to access enabling technologies that are available elsewhere. This will reqtire 
the CGIAR to expand significantly its “technology scouting” effort. Successful biotechnology firms 
invest not only in their internal research capacity, but also in connecting to networks of learning. 
Private companies could assist the CGIAR in this area in several ways-ranging from staff 
and information exchanges to collaboration on specific projects. But for these alliances to take 
shape it is important that the two partners know at the start what they each would gain from the 
partnership. This may require building incentives to make partnerships with the CGIAR attractive to 
the private sector. 
It is equally important to raise the awareness of private sector leaders about the CGIAR 
and its potential as a research partner. It would be useful to organize a high-level conference of 
private sector leaders to familiarize them with the CGIAR and seek their advice on developing 
public-private partnerships to develop tec.hnologies targeted toward orphan market segments in 
developing countries. The CGIAR Private Sector Committee (PSC) is prepared to assist in 
organizing such a conference. 
Strengthening CGIAR-Private Sector 
Partnerships in Biotechnology 
A Private Sector Committee Perspective On Compelling Issues’ 
Introduction: The Need for Stronger Partnerships 
The need to strengthen the research partnerships of the Consultative Group 07 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) with the private sector has become more urgent as 
the result of three recent developments. First is the increasing realization that advances in 
technology are key to overcoming the global problems of poverty, hunger, and environmental 
degradation in developing countries. Second, the private sector is now a major actor in global 
agricultural research, largely because of its increasing involvement in biotechnology. Third, within 
the public agricultural research sector there is increased focus on creating public-private 
partnerships, at the national, regional, and global levels, to address the problems in developing 
countries. 
The private sector has become a dominant actor in agricultural research, particularly in the 
area of agricultural biotechnology. It is estimated that the private sector is responsible for 
approximately 80 percent of research in plant biotechnology worldwide.’ In the United States 
alone, the private sector spent US$595 million on agricultural biotechnology research in 19922 
The private sector’s interest and participation in agricultural biotechnology research has 
increased because of the expanding market opportunities throughout the value chain, from 
agricultural inputs to consumer goods. An indication of the value in these markets is that U.S. 
farmers alone purchase US$3.5’billion of planting seed per year.3 Companies are experimenting 
with different ways to capture value from their investments in biotechnology because the market 
potential of genetically engineered crops is high. It is expected to be $2 billion per year worldwide 
by the year 2000, $6 billion by 2005, and $20 billion by 2OlOP 
The private sector’s large investment in biotechnology has made it a major player in the 
“basic” research end of the “basic-strategic-applied-adaptive research” continuum. This contrasts 
with the private sectors traditional role as the user of the basic and strategic research findings of 
public sector institutions. 
The first transgenic plants were sdd in the United States in 1996. Their commercial 
success solidified the strategic direction of the private sector. (See Annex 1 for an excerpt from the 
Harvard Business Review about the recent experiences of a major U.S. company.) 
While agricultural biotechnology firms were concerned with approval of their regulatory 
‘Prepared by SelGuk Gzgediz (CGIAR Secretariat) on behalf of the CGIAR Private Sector Committee (PSC). 
The PSC discussed an earlier draft at its meeting in London on April l-2, 1997. Comments by PSC 
members and by Joel Cohen, Peter Gregory, Guido Gryseels, Robert Horsch, Manuel Lantin, David 
MacKenzie, Deborah Merrill-Sands, Alexander von der Osten, Michel Petit, Ralph Riley, Suri Sehgal, Frauke 
Spanakakis, and Don Wtnkelmann are gratefully acknowledged, as are research assistance provided by 
Donna Podems (consultant) and secretarial assistance by Timni Mahase (CGIAR Secretariat). 
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submissions on transgenic plants in the early 19905 the CGIAR and its partners were assessing 
how science could be used more effectively to address the developmental and environmental 
challenges faced by developing countries. This was the major theme of the CGIAR’s Renewal 
Program, which, after a careful review of issues, redefined in 1995 the CGIAR system’s mission as 
“contributing through research to sustainable agriculture for food security in developing counttieS 
and outlined a research agenda to help accomplish this mission A major emphasis of the Renewall 
Program-to strengthen global and regional research partnerships-was sparked by a number of 
factors, including the following: 
l Declining public resources devoted to research (both real expenditure per researcher 
and the annual growth rate in research expenditure) 
l The trend toward globalization and its consequences on reduced barriers toward 
cooperation and interdependence 
l Advances in information technology, making communication across the globe 
faster and less costly. 
This paper reflects the views of the CGIAR Private Sector Committee (PSC) on issues that 
have a strong bearing on public-private sector research partnerships. It focuses on biotechnology 
because of the promise it holds for generating quantum leaps in agricultural production. 
Biotechnology alone, however, cannot solve the problems associated with agricultural 
development in developing countries. Additional technologies (e.g., improved seed, fertilizer, and 
crop management techniques) are needed to address key bottlenecks that currently limit 
agricultural production. 
The opportunities for CGIAR-private sector partnerships are not limited to the area of 
biotechnology. The private sector is involved in research on all stages of agricultural production 
and delivery, including agricultural inputs, production technologies and processes, and agricultural 
marketing. In the United States agricultural research spending by the private sector in non- 
biotechnology areas exceeded research spending on agricultural biotechnology by a ratio of more 
than four to one? The PSC will continue to examine the potential for partnerships in these other: 
areas and will advise the CGIAR of possibilities for strengthened collaboration with the private 
sector. 
Compelling Issues 
Three issues are critical to the discussion of public-private partnerships in biotechnology: 
l Intellectual property protection (IPP); 
l Ensuring biosafety 
l Market segments and shifting boundaries between the public and private sectors. 
The key issue for the CGIAR is to determine how it can expand its access to the 
technologies needed to generate improvements in the tropical and orphan commodities that are 
important to poor people in developing countries.6 
Intellectual Property Protection 
The current discussion about public-private research partnerships centers around two 
issues: technology ownership and technology development. 
Technology ownership. Two distinct technologies are used to generate transgenic seeds: 
(1) technology to create the genes that encode the proteins responsible for the (transgenic) trait, 
and (2) technologies related to the techniques for inserting, identifying, or manipulating the genes 
in cells through plant transformation systems, selectable markers, and gene expression 
techniques. Both technologies are needed to produce transgenic plants. 
Recent developments in the management of plant biotechnology in industrialized countries, 
particularly in the United States, illustrate the technology ownership and valuation issues that have 
emerged. These include the following: 
l Research by firms to confer specific traits to plants and the subsequent patenting of the 
results of the new technology 
l Valuation, and separate pricing, of the new trait, distinct from the value of the seed (or 
“vehicle”) that carries the trait 
l Emergence of a “trait markef’ for technologies at the molecular level, enabling the 
bundling of several traits into a germplasm. 
While they are not of immediate relevance to developing countries, such developments 
indicate the types of issues that developing countries could face as their IPP regimes mature. 
These developments also indicate issues that are important to the private sector when considering 
partnerships with developing country institutions and the international Centers. These issues 
include the following: 
l Developing countries with strong IPP regimes, regulatory environments, and private 
sector are of interest to the private sector in the North because there is potential to 
capture value from investments. Such countries would benefit from new technology 
sooner and enter the global biotechnology market sooner than other countries. 
. The Centers, because of their strong ties with developing country institutions, could 
play an important intermediary role in establishing or strengthening IPP regimes in 
developing countries. This could be achieved by providing Center-coordinated 
biotechnology networks, advi’ce to developing countries on regulation and biosafety 
issues, and “honest broker” activities for linking companies with markets. Stronger IPP 
regimes are in the long-term interest of both the local and international private sectors. 
l If a global “trait market” evolves, developing countries and the Centers will be able to 
participate in this market more effectively if they have a cache of”trading chips” in the 
form of traits generated through their own research. 
Technology development. Modern plant breeding, in combination with the use of 
biotechnology, has led to complex forms of IPP. As a result, the entire breeding sector is 
confronted with an expanding variety of different protective rights. For example, a transgenic 
insect-tolerant plant can involve plant breeders’ rights and plant patents as well as patents related 
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to transformation technology, the selectable marker used, the gene coding for the insecticidal 
protein, the promoter, and the various regulatory elements and modifications needed to express 
genes adequately in plant cells.’ 
The string of protections associated with a germplasm is leading to the emergence of a 
complex set of intellectual property rights claims (IPR pedigree) and imposition of legal barriers 
that limit the researchers’ freedom to operate. “Any IPR holder of even one element could block 
the commercialization of an insect-tolerant variety based on this [such as the example presented 
above] package of technologies...Freedom to operate will become even more complicated as 
companies seek to bundle traits to gain competitive advantage. A second generation of transgenic. 
crops are likely to contain both input traits, such as insect resistance and herbicide tolerance, and 
output traits like altered oil and protein quaiity.“8 The complexity of such rights is a major reason for 
the realignments that took place within the biotechnology industry in recent years in the form of 
mergers or acquisitions among large corporations. 
As research in agricultural biotechnology expands globally, the number of new 
technologies generated (and the associated proprietary rights) will increase, creating further 
barriers to the freedom to operate of the smaller players (e.g., the CGIAR and most of the public 
and private research organizations in developing countries). The large companies, with a large 
number of technologies, will be the least affected because they can trade with third parties in the 
“trait” market from a position of strength. 
In such a situation, unless special arrangements are miade, the public sector will have no 
access to the enabling technologies that are controlled by the private sector and that are so 
important for addressing the problems of tropical crops in the CGIAR’s domain. Thus, a major 
reason in favor of potential partnerships between the CGIAR and the private sector is to gain 
access to private sector technologies for noncompetitive use in developing countries. For the 
private sector to be interested in such partnerships there has to be sufficient incentives. 
While biotechnology is becoming more visible as a tool in technology development, one 
should not lose sight of the fact that it is one of many tools plant scientists use to generate new OI 
improved products. Plant breeding, one of the areas in which the CGIAR has been traditionally 
strong, will continue to be important, as will the various techniquses of crop management. 
Ensuring Biosafety 
A bioengineered product has genes from several varieties of the same crop, but it: 
introduces no more risk to the environment than a similar product generated through traditional1 
means. When biotechnology is used to transfer a gene from a different crop species, bacteria, 01 
animal to a crop variety, however, the public raises questions about the safety of the new variety 
with regard to people and the environment. Questions arise because of the uncertainties about 
how the new variety will affect an ecosystem and how its interactions and behavior will change 
over time. 
These questions are addressed at two levels. First, through self-accountability by the 
biotechnology companies and their scientists according to corporate and professional ethics that 
protect the interest of the public. A company knows full well that its reputation is at stake every time 
it markets a new product. Second, through biosafety regulations of the country. 
Regulatory systems differ from country to country. In the United States, the Food and Drug 
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Administration (FDA) has determined that “plant foods produced through biotechnology present no 
inherent risk and, therefore, should be regulated as any other food entering the marketplace....FDA 
uses the characteristics of the food, not the processes used in its production, as the basis for 
regulating food products derived through biotechnology.“g In contrast, European Union countries 
pay much more attention to the processes used in the production of transgenic products because 
of concerns raised by environmental groups. Developing countries are only beginning to introduce 
legislation on biosafety matters. 
Because of their international and scientific nature, the Centers can effectively promote 
biosafety in developing countries. Through their own practices, they can serve as examples and 
through their participation in biotechnology networks they can help strengthen developing country 
capacities in this area. 
The international field-testing networks coordinated by the Centers are global assets that 
could be used to field-test transgenic crops under tropical conditions, with full attention to biosafety. 
This is another prime area for potential collaboration between agricultural biotechnology research 
firms and the Centers. 
Public-Private Boundaries and Orphan Market Segments 
The vast majority of the world’s ex situ plant germplasm (3.8 million stored seedsamples) 
is held by the public sector-mainly governments and the international Centers. Although the 
Centers hold only 14 percent of these seed samples, “this amounts to roughly 40 percent of the 
unique food-crop germplasm in living collections.“‘qhe elite breeding material of the IARCs on 
tropical and orphan crops is of particular global importance. In contrast, in developed countries, 
most of the important elite breeding material is held by private companies. 
The private sector’s involvement with agricultural biotechnology varies with the crop. 
Companies invest in biotechnology research for crops and market segments where it is possible to 
capture value. Thus, the temperate crops, which are more important in industrial countries, have 
received more attention than tropical c.rops, which are of greater importance in developing 
countries. 
In industrial countries, the private sector’s entry into research on specific commodities has 
not been accompanied by a corresponding scaling down of public sector research activities on the 
same crops. As a result, for some crops there is overlapping effort between the public sector and 
the private sector, which is raising questions about the future role of public research institutions. 
The situation is quite different for tropical crops, which are the primary focus of developing 
countries and the CGIAR. In these cases, the private sector has only a limited role in research; 
most of the strategic and applied research is carried out by the public sector (including the 
CGIAR). 
These two situations are illustratecl in Figure 1, which shows the overlap in research effort 
between the public and private sectors. The horizontal axis shows the types of research on a 
continuum from basic to adaptive. The left side of the horizontal axis (i.e., basic research) 
traditionally has been the domain of the public sector because basic research has been and 
continues to be a public responsibility; the right side of the axis (i.e., adaptive research), which is 
closest to the marketplace, has been the domain of the private sector. Where these two lines 
converge is the overlap in research effort, which differs from crop to crop, as indicated by the 
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vertical axis. The overlaps indicated are illustrative only, as are the crops listed. 
Figure I. Public - Private Boundaries in Agricultural Research 





















The following three key messages emerge from the boundaries illustrated in Figure 1: 
l Although the line separating the two domains has been shifting to the left (i.e., there 
has been increasing involvement by the private sector in strategic research), the speed 
of the shift is much slower for crops of interest to the CGIAR. This means that for the 
foreseeable future (i.e., until market conditions in developing countries make it 
attractive for the private sector to invest heavily in research geared toward crops for 
tropical environments) the research vacuum that exists must be filled by the CGIAR 
and its partners. 
l There is no uniformity across-r even within-crops. For example, the transgenic 
maize developed for temperate regions is not suiitable for tropical environments 
because of differences in stresses. However, some aspects of transgenic research on 
temperate maize would apply to tropical environments and could be a subject of 
discussion between the CGIAR and the private sector. 
l The current focus on biotechnology and the increasing overlap between research 
efforts by the public and private sectors mask the continuing importance of the public 
sector’s role in research areas that are less based on biotechnology, which include the 
following: 
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- Research related to biodiversity, including germplasm conservation 
- Research on ecosystems, management of natural resources, and farming practices 
- Research on public policy issues. 
The private sector is less interested in crops per se than in potential markets and market 
segments for crops within specific countries. In developing countries, there are various market 
segments for a specific crop, ranging frorn resource-rich to resource-poor environments, and from 
small-scale to large-scale producers. The market segments of greatest interest to the private 
companies are those where they can capture the most value. These are usually the market 
segments where the value added to the producer are the greatest, and often they correspond to 
large-scale farming in resource rich areas. 
For a different perspective on public-private sector boundaries, it is useful to identify the 
orphan market segments in the developing world that are not attended to by the private sector. 
This concept is broader than orphan crops, however, as it also includes such crops as rice, wheat, 
and maize where the level of private sector involvement varies. If the CGIAR’s research domain 
covered all orphan market segments, this would complement the involvement of the private sector. 
Despite the weakness of regulatory regimes in many developing countries, major 
international companies are vigorously exploring marketing opportunities in these countries. For 
example, according to a recent review, Efuropean agricultural biotechnology investments in Asia 
increased from $220 million in 1993 to $270 million in 1995. Most of this investment is in the seed 
sector because Asia has become the world’s largest seed consumer in the 1990s.” As these 
investments increase, the private sector Iis likely to expand its focus from the market segment of 
large-scale farming in resource-rich environments to include orphan market segments. This shift in 
focus will require the CGIAR and its partners to reexamine their own focus if they are to avoid 
excessive duplication of effort with the private sector. 
Perspectives on Partnerships 
Private sector firms enter into many partnerships. To understand the dynamics of these 
alliances it is essential to examine the context in which companies operate. For the CGIAR it is 
also important to understand how partnerships work in the area of biotechnology. This section 
covers these subjects and reviews strategy options of the private sector and the CGIAR. 
The Private Sector Context 
First and foremost, corporations have a fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders. 
Corporations act on behalf of the shareholders and their boards and management are accountable 
for their actions. The chief interest of the !shareholders is return on investment. Corporate actions, 
therefore, are judged first by their potential1 impact on shareholder value. 
Corporations also operate in a competitive environment, where timing, competitive 
advantage, and efficiency are key. Many corporate decisions on alliances are dictated by 
considerations of competitive advantage iin a business sector or market. Decisions on long-term 
investments depend on corporate visions and strategies and also involve building competitive v 
advantage over the long term. 
Private corporations also have public responsibilities. As members of communities and 
society, they are frequently engaged in activities that serve ithe public interest. Such activities 
contribute positively to a corporation’s image, which, in turn, often increase the public appeal of the 
corporation’s products and services. This is often a key argument for balancing accountability to 
the shareholders with accountability to the public. 
Finally, the private sector as a whole is interested in global development, because today’s 
poor countries can be regarded as tomorrow’s markets. The sooner incomes rise in the developing 
world, the sooner there will be opportunities to market products and services in these countries. 
Additionally, development may be viewed as an aid to global security and thus discourage 
disruption of global trade and financial markets. 
Many large corporations recognize that they have much to contribute to global 
development. As one corporate executive recently noted, tlransfer of knowledge could help 
developing countries leapfrog from pre- to post-industrial age technologies.‘* What the private 
sector can do to assist this transition will depend on how it is able to balance its accountability to 
shareholders with its responsibility to the public. 
Learning Through Partnerships 
Corporations form partnerships mainly for competitive #advantage. The reasons could be 
proactive (to gain a new competitive edge) or reactive (to not lose ground to the competition). The 
advantage sought is either in the cost structure (greater efficiency) or the revenue base (return on 
investment). Better information, superior technology, better human resources, wider markets, 
better control of uncertainty, and similar advantages are expected to lead to cost or revenue 
advantages and a stronger “bottom line.” 
Being a good partner is regarded as a key corporate asset (sometimes called a company’s 
collaborative advantage) because a well-developed ability to create and sustain fruitful 
collaborations gives a company a significant competitive edge.13 A recent review of literature on 
strategic alliances l4 noted that most partnerships entered into by companies are in the form of 
licensing arrangements, joint ventures, or consortia. Annex 2 provides a summary of the 
advantages and disadvantages of these three forms of partnerships. 
Successful biotechnology firms are intricately connected to various networks. Having an 
internal biotechnology research capacity is necessary but not sufficient for innovation. The 
complexity of the problems faced and the rapidity of the advances in knowledge compel 
companies and their researchers to reach out widely for partners. 
Recent research on the locus of innovation in the U.S. biotechnology sector shows that 
“when the knowledge base of an industry is both complex and expanding and the sources of 
expertise are widely dispersed, the locus of innovation will be found in networks of learning, rather 
than in individual firms.“15 In the area of biotechnology, relevant knowledge is widely distributed 
and constantly changing. It is difficult to produce this knowledge within a single research institution 
or to obtain it easily through only a few market transactions. Thus, biotechnqlogy firms expand to 
ensure that they remain well connected to benefit-rich networks, through both formal and informal 
ties. There appears to be a liability of unconnectecinessat work in biotechnology and other fields in 
which intellectual developments are expanding rapidly.16 
There are several examples of successful transfer of biotechnology between companies 
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from industrialized countries and public institutions in developing countries, most of which were 
facilitated through special international programs.” There are also several examples of 
collaboration between private firms and CGIAR Centers. (Both types are summarized in Annex 4.) 
Two notable features of these partnerships are that they are ad hoc and that their viability depends 
on the goodwill of the corporate partner. 
These findings and observations have the following implications for the scientific capacity 
of the CGIAR: 
l At a minimum, Centers need the capacity to access knowledge and evaluate its 
potential usefulness for their own or their partners’ research. 
l Centers need the capacity to use knowledge obtained from the outside and build on it 
for their own purposes. 
l The Centers’ in-house research capacity in biotechnology is important, but without a 
strong cooperative research dimension this capacity is not likely to lead to rapid 
learning and innovation. 
Questions of Strategy 
CGIAR-private sector research partnerships in biotechnology will become stronger 
through dialogue as their similarities of interest and purpose expand and as both parties build their 
collaborative advantage. In this regard the private sector and the CGIAR face a number of 
strategic choices. 
Questions of strategy for the private sector. Companies enter into alliances with a 
partner they are interested in when that partner offers advantages over other potential partners. 
For biotechnology geared toward developing countries, the private sector can form partnerships 
with the following three types of organizations: 
l Local private companies 
l Public sector institutions 
l International Centers. 
The type of partner preferred depends on the nature of the alliance in termsof its research 
intensity. When the issue is how to ma&et a finished product, a local private company clearly has 
the edge over the others because in such value chain alliances proximity to the market is the 
dominant factor. 
When the issue is how to test a close-to-final produc[ the choice would be a partner who 
can do this most efficiently. A public sector partner would be the most attractive if the effort 
involves a single country; while an international Center might be preferred in multicountry 
situations (most likely, in partnership with several national public institutions.) 
In earlier stages of product development the issue is who to collaborate with to solve a 
series of research problems. In this case, potential partners would be selected based on their 
competence and their complementary skills and assets. Public sector NARS biotechnology 
institutes and CGIAR Centers are the two most likely choices for most companies because the 
local private sector in most developing coiuntries has not yet matured in this area. 
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In all of the above cases, the private sector companies would be interested in: 
l Exclusive arrangements 
l Strengthening IPP regimes (for their own long-term interest) 
l Development of a dynamic private sector. 
Questions of strategy for the CGIAR. The CGIAR’s comparative advantage lies in its 
knowledge of tropical agriculture, experience in applied research, networks of contacts in 
developing countries, germplasm collections, and high-quality iresearch settings. In this respect, 
the CGIAR has few equals in developing countries. 
Two issues are critical for CGIAR’s collaborative advamage in the area of biotechnology: 
(1) its research capacity and (2) its position on protection of intellectual property-in particular, as it 
relates to access to private sector proprietary technology. 
The CGIAR’s capacity in biotechnology. The CGIAR Centers’ capacity in biotechnology is 
small compared with that of the private sector. According to a PSC survey, the Centers spent 
about $22 million in biotechnology in 1995. About $10 million of the $22 million was spent by one 
institute, the ILRI. The remaining $12 million spent by the other ‘15 institutes represented less than 
5 percent of their total expenditures for 1995. 
Including expenditures by the CGIAR Centers, total global investment in agricultural 
biotechnology research geared toward developing countries is about $50 million per year. This 
includes investment by the international technology transfer programs described in Annex Zf8 and 
the spending by indigenous biotechnology institutes in developing countries (e.g., Brazil, China, 
India, Indonesia, and Thailand). 
The $50 million per year for developing countries, however, pales in comparison with the 
approximately $2 billion per year investment (both the public and private sectors) in agricultural 
biotechnology research directed toward industrialized countries. ” While spending for research in 
industrialized countries far exceeds that for developing countries, the problems that could be 
addressed through biotechnology for the developing world are at least as significant from the 
standpoint of global development. 
Thus, the question is not whether the global community should increase its investment in 
agricultural biotechnology research geared toward solving problems in developing countries, but 
rather by how much. How much depends on one’s vision of how rapidly one should generate 
impacts on food security and poverty and on one’s confidence in the potential of biotechnology It 
also depends on the priority of the specific problems that must Ibe addressed. Examples of high- 
priority biotechnology projects include the following: 
l Mapping the genomes of crops of importance to developing countries 
l Research on raising the yield of these crops 
l Research on addressing biotic and abiotic stresses of tropical environments 
l Research on product characteristics (e.g., micronutrilent content) 
l Making crop production more environmentally friendly. 
The CGIAR is in the best position as a research system to lead a major international 
biotechnology effort to address problems of developing countries. This fits well within the CGIAR’s 
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traditional and continuing role as a bridge between the basic and strategic research institutes in 
industrialized countries and the research systems of developing countries. Some research 
problems, such as mapping the cassava genome, need not be worked on separately by several 
developing countries; rather, they each could contribute to the effort. The Rice Biotechnology 
Program is a good example of what can be done, and lessons learned from it could be applied to 
research in other crops (and livestock and fisheries). 
Strengthening the CGIAR’s biotechnology capacity would enable it to: 
l Be better connected to the cutting-edge research in biotechnology 
l Have easier access to and stronger absorptive capacity to use proprietary 
technology from the private sector 
l Build intellectual assets (in the form of protected traits and technologies) that could 
enable it participate more effectively in the changing global biotechnology market 
l Generally expand the developing world’s freedom to operate. 
How quickly the CGIAR should’ expand its biotechnology capacity depends on the 
advantages biotechnology offers for solving the most urgent research problems, which need to be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. How quickly the CGIAR could expand its biotechnology 
capacity depends on the availability of additional funds-additional, because the effort would 
involve little or no replacement of existing activities-and on the amount of technology it can access 
from private companies. 
How the CGIAR expands its biotechnology capacity is also important. To the extent 
possible, it should avoid redundancies in research effort with private companies and advanced 
research institutions and aim to tap existing technologies in the most efficient way. This requires 
that the CGIAR strengthen its connectednessto others’ research in biotechnology, identifying what 
might be of interest to the solution of research problems the CGIAR is working on, and making 
arrangements to access that knowledge. 
The CGIAR’s position on intellectual property protection. It is standard practice in the 
biotechnology research field, among private sector corporations and public sector biotechnology 
institutes, to obtain patents and licenses to claim exclusive access to products or techniques. 
Patents and licenses help trace the values added by all contributing parties to an innovation and 
set the criteria for distribution of benefits. Confidentiality is another norm in all partnerships, most 
of which are bilateral. 
The CGIAR Centers have entered into several confidentiality and licensing agreements 
and, in the case of ILRI, joint ventures (see Annex 3). Their success indicates that the Centers 
have found ways to reconcile the public good nature of their work with the proprietary aspects of 
the private sector biotechnology industry. However, in most of the examples provided, the Centers 
were merely the recipients of freely provided proprietary technology and used it to generate public 
goods targeted for use in specific developing countries. 
If the CGIAR expands its biotechnology capacity significantly, the Centers will also become 
producers of technologies of possible value in the biotechnology market. They will then have to 
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decide if their products should be treated as public goods or should be protected as private goods. 
There is the option of providing free access to some partners (e.g., developing countries) and1 
conditional access to others (e.g., as trading chips with corporations). 
Thus, an increased biotechnology capacity might compel the CGIAR to adopt some of the 
practices of the private sector, while maintaining its basic orientation as a public goods producer. 
Conclusions 
There is a compelling case for the CGIAR to strengthen its capacity in biotechnology. 
However, this should not be at the expense of its existing strengths. Biotechnology should be 
treated as one of the tools Center researchers can use in conjunction with other powerful tools in 
developing agricultural technologies needed in poor countries. 
In strengthening its biotechnology capacity the CGIAR should avoid “re-inventing the 
wheel” and aim to access enabling technologies that are available elsewhere. This will require the 
CGIAR to expand significantly its “technology scouting” effort. In this area, learning from the 
experiences of some companies could be helpful. 
The private sector can assist the CGIAR in this effort also in other ways-ranging from staff 
and information exchange to collaboration on specific projects. Because many of these projects 
will be bilateral (i.e., between a CGIAR Center and a corporation), it is important that the CGIAR 
develop a portfolio of biotechnology projects to bring specificity to potential alliances. It is also 
important to spell out clearly what the two partners would gain from the partnership. 
The CGIAR, despite its global assets and its potential as a viable biotechnology partner is 
not widely known within the private sector. The possibility of a major new CGIAR effort in 
biotechnology presents an opportunity to explore with the leaders of major corporations what can 
be achieved through partnerships, while raising their awareness about the CGIAR. A high-level 
conference of private sector leaders, organized by the CGIAR and its cosponsoring agencies, 
could seek the advice of leading chief executive officers and other corporate officers on ways to 
expand the CGIAR’s freedom to operate in developing technologies targeted toward orphan 
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Scientists at Monsanto are designing products that use 
information at the genetic or molecular level to increase 
productivity. Here are three that are on the market today. 
Newleaf Plus seed potatoes Crop 
Then they inserted the gene in the cotton plant to enable it 
to produce the protein on its own while remaining 
unchanged in other respects. Now when budworms attack, 
they are either repelled or killed by the B.t. 
The NewLeaf Potato. The New Leaf potato, 
bioengineered to defend itself against the destructive 
Colorado potato beetle, is already in use on farms. 
Monsanto also is working on the Newleaf Pius potato with 
inherent resistance to leaf virus, another common scourge. 
Widespread adoption of the product could eliminate the 
manufacture, transportation, distribution, and aerial 
application of millions of pounds of chemicals and residues 
yearly. 
B.t. Cotton. In ordinary z&-microbes known as B.t. 
microbes occur naturally and produce a special protein 
that, although toxic to certain pests, are harmless to other 
insects, wildlife, and people. If the destructive cotton 
budworm. for example, eats B.t. bacteria, it will die. 
Some cotton farmers control budworms by applying to their 
cotton plants a powder containing B-t. But the powder 
often blows or washes away, and reapplying it is 
expensive. The alternative is for farmers to spray the field 
with a chemical insecticide as many as 10 or 12 times per 
season. 
But Monsanto’s scientists had an idea. They identiiied the 
gene that tells the B.t. bacteria to make the special protein. 
Roundup Herbicide and No-Till Fanning. Roundup 
herbicide is a molecule designed to address a major 
problem for farmers: topsoil erosion. Topsoil is necessary 
for root systems because of its organic matter, friability in 
structure, and water-holding capabilities. The subsoil 
underneath is incapable of supporting root systems. 
Historically, farmers have tilled their soil primarily for weed 
control and only to a’ minor extent for seed preparation. But 
plowing loosens soil structure and exposes soil to erosion. 
By replacing plowing with application of herbicides like 
Roundupa practice called conservation Wage--farmers 
end up with better soil quality and less topsoil erosion. 
When sprayed onto a field before crop planting, Roundup 
kills the weeds, eliminating the need for plowing. And 
because the Roundup molecule has been designed to kill 
only what is growing at the time of its initial application, the 
farmer can come back a few days after spraying and begin 
planting; the herbicide will have no effect on the emerging 
seeds. 
I 
* Reprinted by permission of Harvard Business Review. [an Exhibit]. From “Growth through Global Sustainability: An 
Interview with Monsanto’s CEO Robert Shapiro,” by Joan Magretta. January-February 1997. Copyright 0 1997 by the 
President and Fellows of Harvard College, all rights reserved. 
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Annex 2 
Forms of Partnerships 
A recent review of literature on strategic alliances*‘noted that the three most common 
forms of partnerships are licensing arrangements, joint ventures, and consortia. 
Licensing Arrangements 
Licensing arrangements, quite common in the agricultural biotechnology field, enable use 
of a technology by another entity within the limits specified in the agreement. Licensing its 
technology allows a company to maintain some control over the flow of that technology through the 
supply chain. Entering into licensing arrangements with foreign firms enables market expansiort 
without more costly direct investment in unfamiliar markets. Firms, especially in the pharmaceutical 
and chemical industries, also enter into cross-licensing arrangements, in which major firms 
“willingly license their newest technological breakthroughs to one another in order to amortize R&D 
costs and to promote specialization of different research-based competenciesI’*’ 
There are disadvantages to licensing, however. For example, a licensee could become a 
competitor, although this is not an important issue in agreements with public sector licensees. For 
both public sector and private sector licensees, enforcing the patents and IPR agreements could 
become an issue, particularly if enforcement must be pursued in the courts of another country. 
Joint Ventures 
Joint ventures involve two or more parties creating a new entity. Each party brings assets 
to the venture and they share decision-making responsibility. In specialization ventures each 
partner brings to the venture a different but complementary asset (e.g., one partner provides the 
trait, the other the seed). In shared value-adding ventures, partners bring similar assets and share 
responsibilities at each stage of the process (e.g., both conduct research, design products, and 
then market them jointly)!* 
Joint ventures enable each partner to finance only a part of the cost of an activity. This is 
an important factor for high-risk and high-cost projects that no single partner would be able to 
undertake alone (e.g., designing a new video technology). Joint ventures also allow companies to 
expand their markets, particularly if the partners have competitive advantages in different markets. 
The success of a joint venture deplends on how well the partners work together. It is critical 
that all parties clearly understand the others’ expectations and commitments and that they 
continue to learn from each other throughout the venture. If one party dominates the relationship it 
may lead to a dependency syndrome, which is unhealthy for the future of the relationship. 
Consortia 
Consortia are more complex and loosely coupled forms of partnership than joint ventures; 
partners build an interorganizational entity to carry out activities in a specific area. Equivalent to 
consortia are the Japanese keirefsu and the South Korean chaebo/s.23 
Research and development consortia are the most relevant for this report. What 
differentiates R&D consortia from joint ventures is the fact that the former include direct 
competitors, while the latter usually do not. The principal reasons for an institution to join a 
consortium are “to achieve economies of scale, to share the risks involved in an innovation, to set 
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a standard for a new technology, to share complementary knowledge, and to help protect a ‘leaky 
technology’ from being appropriated by companies not sharing in the research effortsi’24 
Consortia are risky for companies if there is any danger of proprietary interests being 
inadvertently compromised. There is also uncertainty about the behavior of other partners in taking 
early advantage of the research findings of the consortium. However, if there is a clear strategic 
advantage for forming a consortium (e.g., because of a threat from a foreign competitor), the 
interest of the partners might outweigh these disadvantages. 
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Annex 3 
Examples of Public-Private Research Partnerships in Biotechnology 
Examples of successful partnerships in research on biotechnology between companies in 
the industrialized countries and public institutions in developing countries and similar examples of 
collaboration between private firms and C:GIAR Centers are presented below. 
Partnerships with Developing Country Public Sector institutions 
Few developing countries have capacity and experience in research on agricultural 
biotechnology. Of those that do (e.g., Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Thailand), their capacity 
is more in the public sector than in the private sector, which parallels the early situation in 
industrialized countries. 
As the markets and IPR regimes in developing countries become stronger, corporations in 
the industrialized countries are becoming] increasingly interested in entering those markets. In the 
interim, technology transfer in biotechnology is being facilitated through a number of international 
programs, the most prominent of which are the following: 
l International Service for the Acquisition of Agribiotech Applications (ISAAA) 
l Agricultural Biotechnology for Sustainable Productivity (ABSP) Program based at 
Michigan State University 
l The Rice Biotechnology Program of Rockefeller Foundation 
l The Intermediary Biotechnology Service (IBS) based at ISNAR. 
Examples of agricultural biotechnology transfer from the private sector to developing 
countries through some of these intermediary programs are shown in Table 1. 
Partnerships with CGIAR Centers 
One of the first activities of the Private Sector Committee of the CGIAR was to conduct a 
questionnaire survey of the CGIAR Centers focusing on two key issues: to understand CGIAR 
Centers’ associations with private sector institutions and to assess the potential for future 
collaboration. The responses and follow-up discussions with Center staff indicated that several 
Centers have participated in biotechnology research partnerships with corporations from 
industrialized countries. These are described in the following paragraphs. 
The International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) has long-standing cooperative 
agreements with the pharmaceutical industry whereby the pharmaceutical industry provides ILRI 
with expertise on vaccine delivery systeims, production facilities, and marketing and distribution 
concerns, and ILRI provides the active research on potential antigens and protective immunity for 
the development of vaccines to combat tropical diseases in livestock. ILRI has taken steps to 
patent its research findings in this area to ensure continued cooperation of private sector partners. 
The patent applies only to the research phase of vaccine development and will not affect the 
availability of the final product to users in developing countries. Although knowledge and expertise 
have been transferred to the private sector through collaborative research, the private sector has 
not yet marketed any final products. 
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Table 1. Examples of Agricultural Biotechnology Transfer 











protein genes, for 
resistance to Asian 
stemborer 
Bioreactor technology 
for micropropagation of 
banana, pineapple, 
coffee, and ornamental 
palms 
Transformation 
technology for the 
development of virus- 
resistant sweet potato 
Transformation 
technology for the 
development of 
potatoes resistant to 
potato virus x and y 
Coat-protein technology 
for the development of 
melons resistant to 
cucumber mosaic virus 
ELISA kits for local 
maize viruses 
ICI Seeds (USA) 
DNA Plant Technology Agribiotecnologia de 
(USA) Costa Rica (ACR) 
Monsanto (USA) 
Monsanto (USA) 
Asgrow Seed (USA) 
Pioneer Hi-Bred (USA) 
Central Research 







Center for Advanced 
Research Studies 
(CINVESTAV, Me.xico) 
Research Center in Cell 
and Molecular Biology 
(CIBCM, Costa Rica) 
CINVESTAV (Mexico) 
National Research1 








Feathery mottle virus- 
resistant sweet potato 
for African farmers 
International Service 





Source: Cohen, J. I., and J. Komen. 1995. “Research Collaboration, Management and Technology Transfer: 
Meeting the Needs of Developing Countries.” In D. Altman and K. Witananbe, eds., Plant Biotechnology 
Transfer to Developing Countries, pp. 253-266. San Diego/Austin: Academic PresslRG Landes Company. 
The Centro lnternacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT) is actively collaborating with 
Sandoz Seeds, Ltd. (Switzerland), mediated by ISAAA. Sandoz Seeds has licensed the use of its 
proprietary “positive selection technology” for use in cassava by CIAT on a non-fee basis and 
under specified conditions. The IPRs on the technology remain the property of Sandoz Seeds. The 
technology is to be used only for the transformation of cassava and only in the laboratories of 
CIAT; licensing for use in other crops or other laboratories will be considered by Sandoz Seeds on 
a case-by-case basis. CIAT may evaluate and distribute transgenic cassava plants resulting from 
the use of the technology in any part of the world, providing that the target countries have 
implemented biosafety regulations and that deliberate release is approved. The agreement 
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between CIAT and Sandoz Seeds includes a confidentiality clause. 
The international Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is actively collaborating with several 
private sector firms in its biotechnology program. Plantech (Japan) and Ciba-Geigy (Switzerland) 
made two Bt genes available to IRRI. The agreements with these companies enable IRRI to 
“conduct research to improve the function of the genes in rice and ultimately make the products of 
this research freely available in most developing countries. Under the agreement signed with 
Plantech, a consortium including lRRl and some other institutions paid a fee to use theat gene for 
research purposes only. After the research phase, the consortium has the option to buy the gene 
outright from Plantech at an already agreed price. Under the agreement signed with Ciba-Geigy, 
the Bt gene was provided to IRRI at no charge. &rice produced with this gene can be made freely 
available to rice producers in all countries except Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, United 
States, and members of the European Patent Convention as of 1 9941’25 
The Centro lnternacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo (CIMMYT) has a major 
biotechnology program and collaborates with private sector institutions on research. It has material 
transfer agreements with the private sector involving maize trials conducted by private seed 
companies in developing countries. It also collaborates with the private sector within the Latin 
American Maize Program (LAMP) for evaluation of maize accessions held in Latin American gene 
banks. 
The Centro lnternacional de la IPapa (CIP) has been collaborating with two companies to 
develop transgenic potatoes with increiased resistance to pests and diseases. “Plant Genetic 
Systems (PGS) of Belgium has provided genes and technologies to enhance insect pest 
resistance using Bt genes. AXIS Genetics (UK) has provided genes and transgenic potatoes and 
sweet potatoes using cowpea trypsin inhibitor and snowdrop lectin genes. The results of 
collaborative research with private companies are freely available for developing countries, 
provided the recipient will not appropriate them unfairly or seek profit through their 
commercialization in industrial countries.“26 
The International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR) hosts the 
Intermediary Biotechnology Service (IBS), which assists national agricultural research systems in 
developing countries with needs-oriented biotechnology program management. Its activities 
include providing advice on policy formulation, country reviews, and identifying and collecting 
information on international biotechnology program expertise. 
18 
Annex 4 
CGIAR Private Sector Committee 
Mission Statement 
The Private Sector Committee’s mission is to provide a private sector perspective to the CGIAR 
regarding the current status and future needs of global agricultural research. Through its 
membership the Committee ref7ects lthe views of national and international for-profit enterprises of 
varying scales and with direct interest in agricultural research. 
The Committee serves as a link between the CGIAR and the private sector at large and aims to 
forge new alliances for improving food security and the quality of the environment. It helps identify 
collaborative research opportunities of mutual benefit. 
The Committee works closely with representatives of other major partners in agricultural 
research, including the international centers, national research systems, and non-governmental 
organizations. It also helps raise the awareness of the global community to the opportunities 
agricultural-research provides for creating better livelihoods for present and future generations. 
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Composition of the CGIAR Private Sector Committee 
Co-Chairs 
Dr. Andreas J. Buchting 
Chairman of the Executive Board 
KWS Kleinwanzlebener Saatzucht AG 
P.O. Box 1463 
D-37555 Einbeck 
Germany 
Tel.: +49-5561-311-211 (direct line) 
Fax.: +49-5561-31 l-200 
Committee Members 
Mr. Alejandro Rodriguez Graue 
General Director 
Agroindustrias Moderna 
Rio Caura 358 Ote. 
Col. Del Valle 




Dr. Pramod K. Agrawal 
General Manager 
PROAGRO PGS India Ltd. 
A-305, Ansal Chambers-l 
3 Bhikaiji Cama Place 
New Delhi 110 066 
India 
Tel.: +91-11-619-4185 or 618-5182 
Fax.: +91-11-619-4185 or619-2184 
Dr. Carol Mallette Amaratunga 
Executive Director 
Maritime Centre of Excellence for Women’s Health 
c/o IWK Grace Health Centre 
5850/5980 University Avenue 




e-mail: camaratu@tupdeanl .med.dal .ca 
e-mail: cartis@iced.ns.ca 
Mr. R. N. Sam Dryden 
Managing Director 
Big Stone Partners 
1634 Walnut Street, Suite 301 





Dr. Assia Bensalah Alaoui 
Director of Research 
Center for Strategic Studies 
Universite Mohammed V 
Boulevard des Nations 
Unies B.P. 721 
Rabat 
Morocco 
Tel.: +212-7-76-35-78 or 76-35-95 
Fax.: +212-7-76-27-32 
Mr. Bernard P. Auxenfans 
Group Vice President and General Manager 
International Division 
Crop Protection Business Unit 
Monsanto Company 
800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard 
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General Manager 
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Cairo 
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P.O. Box 6617 
Jakarta 10270 
Indonesia 
Tel.: +62-21-573-3010 (direct line) 
Tel.: +62-21-570-3246 (ext. 5424) 
Fax.: +62-21-573-2564 
Dr. Dinguri Nick Mwaniki 
Chairman/CEO 
Coda Corporation Group 
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Woodmead, Sandton 
South Africa 
Tel.: +27-l l-803-3150 
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